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829 
Creditors, Keepers:  
Passive Retention of Estate Property 
and the Automatic Stay 
 
The automatic stay provision is one of the most important provisions in 
the Bankruptcy Code. Until recently, however, it has remained unclear if 
passive retention of property of the bankruptcy estate must be immediately 
turned over to the debtor under the automatic stay provision. The Supreme 
Court decided in City of Chicago v. Fulton that passive retention does not violate 
the automatic stay, saving creditors from the consequences of retaining estate 
property. The debate about the stay, however, is far from over. Many circuit 
courts were already concerned about the policy issues deriving from the City of 
Chicago maintaining possession over debtors’ vehicles, rendering debtors 
unable to get to work or pay off their debts during the bankruptcy plan. Justice 
Sotomayor remains frustrated about these policy concerns and called on 
Congress to change the Code and enable debtors to be more successful in their 
payment plans. This Note suggests Congress make language and cross-reference 
changes to the Bankruptcy Code to satisfy both textual and policy issues 
associated with the current Code.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Chicago, one of the largest and most racially segregated cities in 
America, is undergoing issues with bankruptcy on many levels. 
Currently itself under threat of filing for municipal bankruptcy,1 it also 
leads the nation in chapter 13 bankruptcy filings.2 The concentration of 
these filings is three times higher in predominantly Black 
neighborhoods,3 adding more tension to a highly segregated city.4 In 
fact, the rate of filings by Black residents in the Northern District of 
Illinois rose eighty-eight percent between 2011 and 2015.5 While this 
 
 1. Richard Porter, Commentary: Bankruptcy Looms for Chicago If There’s No Pension Fix, 
CHI. TRIB. (Sept. 26, 2019, 2:05 PM), https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/commentary/ct-
opinion-bankruptcy-chicago-pensions-crisis-20190926-4iwzdnfcjzh2tac7pw6i5fbgea-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/3PW3-MB4L]. 
 2. City Unveils Vehicle Sticker Amnesty, Ticket Relief Programs for Scofflaw Drivers, CBS 
CHI. (Sept. 27, 2019, 11:47 AM), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2019/09/27/city-unveils-vehicle-
sticker-amnesty-ticket-relief-programs-for-scofflaw-drivers/ [https://perma.cc/3AEK-L9UC]. 
Chapter 13 bankruptcy is for debtors who earn a regular income and therefore can pay in an 
installment plan created during the bankruptcy case. Chapter 13 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., 
https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-13-bankruptcy-
basics (last visited Jan. 31, 2021) [https://perma.cc/8F4U-B6HR]. This chapter often allows debtors 
to keep their homes or cars. Id. 
 3. Women in Cook County’s Communities of Color File Bankruptcy at Disproportionately 
High Rates, Finds New Report, WOODSTOCK INST., (May 3, 2011, 4:00 AM), 
https://woodstockinst.org/news/press-release/women-cook-countys-communities-color-file-
bankruptcy-disproportionately-high-rates-finds-new-report/ [https://perma.cc/NC24-ZFA4]. 
 4. Detroit, Chicago, Memphis: The 25 Most Segregated Cities in America, USA TODAY (July 
20, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/picture-gallery/money/2019/07/20/detroit-chicago-
memphis-most-segregated-cities-housing-policies/1780223001/ [https://perma.cc/7K9E-A6RA]. 
 5. Paul Kiel & Hannah Fresques, How the Bankruptcy System Is Failing Black Americans, 
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 27, 2017), https://features.propublica.org/bankruptcy-inequality/bankruptcy-
failing-black-americans-debt-chapter-13/ [https://perma.cc/XF4D-L3HM]. 
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may confound the average reader, many people familiar with the city 
wholeheartedly believe they know the cause—parking tickets.6  
Often, unpaid parking tickets will result in the city seizing a car 
and selling it for scrap metal.7 Debtors, unable to pay off the parking 
tickets, file for bankruptcy to help them get control of their finances.8 
Before the summer of 2019, however, the City of Chicago was able to 
hold onto debtors’ cars for months before proceedings for the turnover 
of the cars made their way through the bankruptcy courts.9 Without a 
reliable way to get to work, many debtors were inhibited from 
successfully completing their debt repayment plans.10 The city recently 
succeeded at the Supreme Court in its efforts to return to its former 
policy.11 Following the Supreme Court’s ruling in In re Fulton in 
January 2021, the city can hold onto debtors’ cars until an adversary 
proceeding is completed for their turnover.12 This process takes an 
average of one hundred days.13 
Prior to the Court’s most recent ruling, circuits were split over 
whether passive retention of a debtor’s property possessed prior to a 
bankruptcy filing violates one of the Bankruptcy Code’s most treasured 
provisions—the automatic stay.14 Generally, the automatic stay 
immediately stops creditors’ collection efforts once a debtor files for 
bankruptcy, though there are specific provisions of the Code that define 
the scope of the stay.15 The Code currently prohibits “any act . . . to 
exercise control over property of the estate.”16 Five circuits, including 
 
 6. Edward R. Morrison & Antoine Uettwiller, Consumer Bankruptcy Pathologies 2 
(Columbia L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 550, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2845497 [https://perma.cc/NB25-7GZ5]; City Unveils Vehicle Sticker Amnesty, Ticket 
Relief Programs for Scofflaw Drivers, supra note 2. 
 7. Elliott Ramos & Claudia Morell, Lawsuits, Stalled Legislation, and New Mayor. What’s 
Going on with Chicago’s Ticketing Reform?, WBEZ (June 7, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.wbez.org/ 
shows/wbez-news/chicago-ticketing-and-towing-facing-lawsuits-stalled-legislation-lori-lightfoot-
ticket-reform/20826dc6-4d9e-4027-8645-d338f4ac238f [https://perma.cc/XR9B-E8XG]. 
 8. Edward Morrison, Parking Tickets Drive Bankruptcy’s Racial Disparity, COLUM. L. SCH. 
(Oct. 24, 2019), https://clawstage.ohodev.com/news/archive/parking-tickets-drive-bankruptcys-
racial-disparity [https://perma.cc/DVK6-QYGL]. 
 9. Melissa Sanchez, Chicago Can’t Hold Impounded Vehicles After Drivers File for 
Bankruptcy, Court Says, PROPUBLICA, https://www.propublica.org/article/chicago-drivers-
bankruptcies-impounded-vehicles-federal-appeals-court (last updated Oct. 3, 2019) 
[https://perma.cc/83KM-LM7M]. 
 10. Id. 
 11. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 587 (2021). 
 12. Id. at 591. 
 13. Id. at 594 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 14. Midlantic Nat’l Bank v. N.J. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 474 U.S. 494, 503 (1986) (citing S. REP. 
NO. 95-989, at 54 (1978)). 
 15. Automatic Stay, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE DICTIONARY OF BANKRUPTCY 
TERMS (3d ed. 2020). 
 16. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
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the Seventh Circuit, which sits in Chicago, previously held that passive 
retention of property of the estate violates the automatic stay.17 Three 
circuits disagreed and held the opposite.18 The Supreme Court sided 
with the circuit minority, unanimously holding that passive retention 
of estate property does not violate the automatic stay.19 While the 
Court’s recent decision adheres to the text of the Code, it does not 
adhere to the policy goals of bankruptcy law. Although both competing 
approaches had textual analysis supporting their divergent opinions, 
the minority approach, recently adopted by the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the statute’s words, is more textually persuasive.20 But 
the minority approach does not embody the strongest policy 
considerations Congress had in mind while drafting the Bankruptcy 
Code.21 Therefore, the judicial opinion from the Supreme Court still 
cannot fully resolve the issue.  
This Note proposes that the language in § 362(a)(3) of the 
Bankruptcy Code be amended to prohibit “any exercise of control over 
property of the estate that the debtor may require for the successful 
completion of its payment plan confirmed under chapters 12 and 13.” 
Only then will bankruptcy law reflect the policy goals originally 
imagined by Congress and remain faithful to the text of the statute. If 
implemented, this amendment would require the City of Chicago to 
return debtors’ cars once the debtors file for bankruptcy, enabling 
debtors to get to work and contribute toward the payment plan essential 
to chapter 13 bankruptcy cases.  
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the automatic stay 
and related provisions in the Bankruptcy Code. Part II discusses the 
difficulty that lower courts had in interpreting § 362(a)(3) and the 
Supreme Court’s decision in In re Fulton. Lastly, Part III argues that 
the Supreme Court decision interpreting the Code is unsatisfactory and 
that Congress needs to amend the Bankruptcy Code because it is the 
only way to effectuate the policy concerns rooted in the American 
bankruptcy system while staying true to the statutory text.  
 
 17. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019); Weber v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72 
(2d Cir. 2013); Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier (In re Rozier), 376 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2004) 
(per curiam); Cal. Emp. Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1989). Property of the estate 
includes all of the debtor’s interests in any property as of the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541. 
 18. In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2019); WD Equip., LLC v. Cowen (In re 
Cowen), 849 F.3d 943 (10th Cir. 2017); United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467 (D.C.  
Cir. 1991). 
 19. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 587 (2021). 
 20. See infra Section II.B.1 (discussing the minority’s focus on “act”). 
 21. See infra Section II.B.2 (noting policy concerns). 
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I. A BREATH OF FRESH AIR: THE HISTORY OF THE AUTOMATIC STAY 
Section 362 of the Bankruptcy Code, the automatic stay 
provision, dictates whether a creditor must immediately return a 
debtor’s property or risk sanctions. Analyzing the effects of the stay, 
however, requires an understanding of other provisions of the Code 
such as § 361, the adequate protection provision, and § 542, the 
turnover provision. These provisions apply to all chapters of 
bankruptcy.22 While the Fulton decision answered the questions 
regarding passive retention of estate property under § 362(a), it punted 
many of the other questions about how the Bankruptcy Code’s multiple 
provisions shape interactions between creditors and debtors.23 Before 
turning to the ultimate issue of whether property seized before a debtor 
filed for bankruptcy must be promptly returned to a debtor, this Note 
will briefly summarize how these provisions were developed, how they 
fit together in the greater scheme of the Code, and the questions yet to 
be satisfactorily answered about their interaction.  
A. The History of the Bankruptcy Code and Relevant Provisions 
The main purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to “aid the 
unfortunate debtor by giving him a fresh start in life,” and the Code 
remains “not only of private but of great public interest.”24 Many 
debtors utilize the Code to fairly and methodically pay back their 
creditors. For individuals, chapter 13 bankruptcy is often the most 
attractive option.25 Chapter 13, as opposed to chapter 7, allows debtors 
to maintain possession of their property, discharge certain debts that 
would not be dischargeable under chapter 7, and open the door to the 
possibility of a more favorable future credit score.26 Chapter 13 
bankruptcy involves creating a payment plan in which the debtor pays 
off her debts to creditors out of her future income.27 A bankruptcy court 
then must confirm the plan.28 The plan allows a debtor to pay back some 
 
 22. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (“[C]hapters 1, 3, and 5 of this title” apply to chapters 7, 11, 12,  
and 13.). 
 23. See Fulton, 141 S. Ct. at 592 (declining to address concerns about the turnover provision’s 
operation or other subsections of Section 362). 
 24. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918). 
 25. GENEVIEVE HEBERT FAJARDO & RAMONA L. LAMPLEY, 28 TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: 
CONSUMER RIGHTS AND REMEDIES 3D § 16.17, Westlaw (database updated June 2020). 
 26. Id. Chapter 7 is liquidation bankruptcy, in which the debtor’s assets are sold to repay 
debts. A discharge is what a debtor receives in bankruptcy, which essentially eliminates any debt 
acquired before the debtor filed, even if it was not completely paid off. This is why bankruptcy is 
often described as a fresh start. 
 27. 11 U.S.C. § 1321. 
 28. Id. § 1325. 
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of her debts over the course of three to five years.29 Individuals may file 
chapter 13 bankruptcies only if they can prove that their creditors will 
receive at least as much as they would have under a chapter  
7 bankruptcy.30 
One of the most important provisions in the Bankruptcy Code 
creates the automatic stay, which “gives the debtor a breathing spell 
from his creditors.”31 The automatic stay has often been compared to an 
injunction, prohibiting both formal and informal collection methods 
against the debtor once she has filed for bankruptcy.32 The list of these 
prohibited collection attempts can be found in § 362(a), and the 
exceptions are very limited.33 The automatic stay is, as it sounds, 
automatic.34 It is triggered by the debtor filing a bankruptcy petition 
and does not require a motion to the bankruptcy court or even notice  
to creditors.35  
Until 1973, the automatic stay provisions were available only 
under chapter X, and the debtor had to make an affirmative application 
to restrain collection efforts.36 With the adoption of the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure, the debtor received an automatic stay, getting 
rid of the injunction application process.37 The burden then shifted to 
 
 29. Id. § 1325(b)(4). 
 30. Id. § 1325(a)(4). In a chapter 7 case, the debtor’s assets are immediately liquidated, and 
there is not a payment plan. Chapter 7 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/ 
services-forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-7-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Jan. 31, 
2021) [https://perma.cc/K5EU-RHLQ]. 
 31. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 54 (1978). Essentially, the automatic stay freezes all debt collection 
efforts made against the debtor by creditors. In a chapter 13 case, the automatic stay can last the 
entire length of the plan because the debtor makes periodic payments based on the regular income. 
There are certain exceptions regarding domestic support obligations, tax refunds, and licenses that 
do not bear on this general analysis. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (exceptions to the stay include criminal 
actions against the debtor, certain civil actions, domestic support obligations, and more). 
 32. Claudia A. Restrepo, Comment, A Pro Debtor and Majority Approach to the “Automatic 
Stay” Provision of the Bankruptcy Code—In re Cowen Incorrectly Decided, 59 B.C. L. REV. E-
SUPPLEMENT 537, 540 (2018). 
 33. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (listing what the automatic stay prohibits); Id. § 362(b) (listing  
the exceptions).  
 34. MICHAEL D. SIROTA & MICHAEL S. MEISEL, 44 N.J. PRACTICE SERIES: DEBTOR-CREDITOR 
LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.31, Westlaw (database updated Sept. 2020). 
 35. McKeen v. FDIC, 549 S.E.2d 104, 106 (Ga. 2001); SIROTA & MEISEL, supra note 34. 
 36. WILLIAM L. NORTON III, 2 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 3D § 43:2, Westlaw 
(database updated Jan. 2021). Before the new Code, bankruptcy chapters were referred to using 
roman numerals.  
 37. Id. Congress enacted this change as the Code became more debtor friendly over time. See 
id. (“The burden was shifted to the creditor who sought to obtain relief from the stay to file a 
complaint in an adversary proceeding upon a showing of cause.”). Previously, the bankruptcy court 
had jurisdiction only over property in the debtor’s possession, whether actual or constructive. See 
id. § 43:1 (discussing the difference between the historical jurisdiction that bankruptcy courts had 
over straight bankruptcy cases and rehabilitation cases). After reforms, the automatic stay existed 
only in the former Chapter X, which covered corporate bankruptcy and is now revised into Chapter 
11. See id. § 43:2. With the adoption of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, the automatic 
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the creditor to request relief from the stay.38 The precise language of 
§ 362(a)(3) has remained unchanged since 1984, when Congress 
amended the provision to prohibit “any act to . . . exercise control over 
property of the estate.”39 The automatic stay also protects creditors’ 
rights by ensuring the bankruptcy filing does not trigger a race to 
collect.40 Without it, the creditors who are able to act first would deplete 
the resources of the estate before the court decides how to distribute the 
debtor’s assets for the benefit of all creditors.41  
The automatic stay provision works in tandem with the turnover 
provision of § 542(a), which states that a creditor “shall deliver to the 
trustee . . . [any] property . . . unless such property is of 
inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.”42 Disagreement remains 
over whether the turnover provision is self-operative, though the word 
“shall” indicates to many courts and scholars that § 542(a) is self-
executing and mandatory.43 For example, if the turnover provision is 
not self-executing and mandatory, the trustee in a bankruptcy case 
would have to initiate a turnover proceeding every time a debtor wanted 
to regain possession of her car from the City of Chicago.44 Although the 
Court did not address the ultimate question of how the bankruptcy 
court should treat the turnover provision, the Fulton decision held that 
maintaining possession until the turnover order does not violate the 
 
stay was applied to all bankruptcy cases. Id. This meant that creditors could not pick apart 
bankruptcy estates to the detriment of all other creditors. See id. § 43:1 (describing  
bankruptcy courts’ authority to institute an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors 
are treated equally). 
 38. Id. § 43:2. 
 39. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). See generally Ralph Brubaker, Turnover, Adequate Protection, and 
the Automatic Stay (Part I): Origins and Evolution of the Turnover Power, 33 BANKR. L. LETTER, 
Aug. 2013, Westlaw 33 No. 8 BLL-NL 1 (discussing the 1984 amendments). Additional major 
amendments occurred in 1994 and 2005, but these concerned exceptions to the automatic stay and 
did not change the language of § 362(a)(3). See NORTON III, supra note 36, § 43:3 (referencing the 
1994 and 2005 amendments). 
 40. H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 340 (1977). 
 41. The commencement of a bankruptcy case creates an estate, which consists of “all legal or 
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case.” 11 U.S.C. 
§ 541(a)(1). Consequently, if a creditor obtains property of the estate, it adversely affects all other 
creditors because the estate consists of everything the debtor owns. 
 42. Id. § 542(a). 
 43. See, e.g., In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 924 (7th Cir. 2019) (finding that “shall” in § 542(a) 
makes turnover compulsory); 3A BANKRUPTCY SERVICE LAWYERS EDITION Absolute Nature of 
Turnover Duty § 30:11 Westlaw (database updated Jan. 2021) (collecting cases that discuss the 
mandatory nature of the turnover duty). But see In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 128 (3d Cir. 
2019) (rejecting the notion that turnover is self-executing). The Third Circuit partly relied on this 
difference in their holding that passive retention of estate property does not violate the automatic 
stay. See infra Section II.B (discussing the Third Circuit’s assertion that an “act” requires more 
than retaining possession). 
 44. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001(1). 
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automatic stay.45 This means that until the turnover proceeding is held 
and decided, a debtor is left without her vehicle.  
Section 361, the adequate protection provision, must also be 
taken into account when considering the turnover provision and the 
automatic stay.46 A creditor can request adequate protection in any case 
to protect its interest in the property it is turning over,47 and a court 
will grant adequate protection measures to acknowledge any 
depreciation an asset may undergo once the property is turned over.48 
For example, in cases involving vehicles, there is a valid concern that 
the creditor’s interest in the car will decrease or disappear if the debtor 
is in an accident or any other damage occurs to the vehicle.49 Protection 
can take the form of periodic cash payments on the property or 
requiring insurance coverage on the property.50 If the trustee cannot 
provide adequate protection, the court may prohibit the use of the 
property.51 A creditor must affirmatively request adequate protection, 
or it will lose the opportunity to obtain it.52   
If the turnover provision has a higher priority in the Code, i.e., 
is self-executing and mandatory, then a creditor must turn over the 
property prior to receiving adequate protection.53 If the adequate 
protection provision controls, then a creditor is not required to turn over 
property until it receives adequate protection.54 The Supreme Court 
recently reiterated that it is unclear how the turnover provision is 
expected to operate in lower courts, leaving it up to the lower courts to 
parse out details regarding the interaction between adequate protection 
and the turnover provision.55 
 
 45. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 587 (2021). 
 46. 11 U.S.C. §§ 361-362, 542. 
 47. Chase Manhattan Bank USA NA v. Stembridge (In re Stembridge), 394 F.3d 383, 387 
(5th Cir. 2004). 
 48. Id. 
 49. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19, City of Chicago v. Fulton, 140 S. Ct. 680 (2019) (No. 
19-357). 
 50. 11 U.S.C. § 361(1); In re Denby-Peterson, 576 B.R. 66, 81–82 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2017) (not 
addressed on appeal in In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115 (3d Cir. 2019)); 3 COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY ¶ 361.03[2] (Henry J. Sommer & Richard Levin eds., 16th ed. 2020). 
 51. 11 U.S.C. § 363(e). The trustee is the appointed custodian and administrator of the 
bankruptcy estate. He or she possesses extensive powers in order to perform his or her duty of 
maximizing the value of the estate. 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 509 (2020). 
 52. TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Sharon (In re Sharon), 234 B.R. 676, 682 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999).  
 53. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 924 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that turnover is compulsory upon 
filing or else the adequate protection provision would be rendered meaningless). 
 54. In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 128 (holding that because the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure list procedural requirements to initiate a turnover, turnover is not self-
executed upon a debtor’s filing). 
 55. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 592 (2021). 
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B. Supreme Court Decisions on Turnover and the Automatic Stay 
The Supreme Court has sparingly dealt with actions regarding 
violations of the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay,56 even though the 
stay is one of the Code’s most litigated provisions.57 In United States v. 
Whiting Pools, Inc., the Court examined whether the IRS must return 
property seized under a tax lien when a debtor files for chapter 11 
bankruptcy.58 The Court resolved this issue under the turnover 
provision, rather than the automatic stay provision.59 Explaining that 
although outside of bankruptcy obtaining possession of property may be 
an available manner in which a creditor can enforce its lien, the Court 
noted that bankruptcy law “modifies the procedural rights” otherwise 
held by the creditor.60 Because the estate in question was so broad, it 
did not matter that the debtor may not have had a possessory interest 
in the property pre-petition.61 Several provisions in the Code envision 
bringing property not currently in the debtor’s possession into the 
bankruptcy estate.62 The Court highlighted that instead of excluding 
property a secured creditor may have had an interest in from the estate, 
Congress provided creditors with the option of adequate protection.63 
Therefore, the turnover provision “requires the [creditor] to seek 
protection of its interest according to the congressionally established 
bankruptcy procedures, rather than by withholding the seized property 
from the debtor’s efforts to reorganize.”64  
In Whiting Pools, the Court ordered the IRS to return the seized 
collateral in question.65 The Court did not, however, directly address 
whether the turnover of the estate property must occur before or after 
the creditor secures adequate protection. The Court in Whiting Pools 
 
 56. In fact, from 1982–2017, only 2.5 percent of the Court’s civil cases dealt with the entire 
Bankruptcy Code. RONALD J. MANN, BANKRUPTCY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 31 (2017). Mann, 
a Columbia law professor, goes as far as to say that the Court remains “systematically 
underinformed about the importance of the Bankruptcy Power and the relief it provides.” Id. Why 
the Supreme Court does not regularly grant petitions to these cases remains unclear. 
 57. Lawrence Ponoroff, A.L.I.-A.B.A. Continuing Legal Educ., Understanding the Law of 
Bankruptcy—A Primer on Basic Bankruptcy Rules, Concepts, and Policies (Mar. 26–28, 2003), 
Westlaw SH042 ALI-ABA 1, at *16. 
 58. 462 U.S. 198, 200–202 (1983). 
 59. Id. at 202–08 (examining the issue under the § 542). 
 60. Id. at 206. 
 61. Id. at 205. 
 62. Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 543, 547-48). 
 63. Id. at 203–04. 
 64. Id. at 212. 
 65. Id. at 210–12. 
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ordered creditors not to engage in self-help66—in that case, maintaining 
possession—to acquire adequate protection.67  
The Supreme Court complicated matters by carefully parsing 
what constitutes property in Citizens Bank of Maryland v. Strumpf, 
which examined the automatic stay provision.68 In Strumpf, a bank 
placed an administrative freeze on a debtor’s account because he had 
taken out a loan.69 The Court held that such a freeze did not violate the 
automatic stay because it did not permanently deduct the amount in 
the debtor’s account, as a setoff would.70  
Most notably, the Court held that placing an administrative 
freeze on a bank account did not violate § 362(a)(3) of the automatic 
stay provision because the creditor did not take something from the 
debtor, nor did it “exercis[e] dominion over property that belonged to 
[the debtor].”71 The bank account was only a promise of the bank to pay 
the debtor, not his actual money.72 Although the debtor could not gain 
possession of money that was rightfully his, the Court hinted that the 
automatic stay provision may be more complicated than previously 
thought by distinguishing a bank account as a promise to pay and not 
actual property.73 The Court did not, however, address the implications 
of its holding for bankruptcy cases where creditors exercise control  
over the debtor’s actual property, as in the vehicle cases addressed in  
this Note.74 
The Bankruptcy Code, while developing steadily since the 1970s, 
still contains ambiguities in some of its most central provisions.75 The 
breadth of the automatic stay and the relationship between the 
automatic stay, turnover, and adequate protection still confound 
debtors and creditors.76 Without knowing exactly how these provisions 
 
 66. Self-help would be efforts the creditor takes unilaterally to enforce the debt outside of the 
bankruptcy case. 
 67. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 211–12. 
 68. 516 U.S. 16, 17 (1995). 
 69. This case mainly discusses § 362(a)(7), which places a stay on “setoff” rights. In Strumpf, 
the bank would not pay withdrawals on the account up to the amount the debtor owed on the loan. 
For example, if the debtor wrote a check for $20, the bank would not execute the payment. See id 
at 17–18 (explaining the nature of the bank’s actions). 
 70. Id. at 19. An example of a setoff is when the creditor has $300 of the debtor’s money in its 
possession, but the debtor also owes the creditor $1,000. The creditor would apply the $300 to the 
debt and say that the debtor now only owes it $700. 
 71. Id. at 21. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Michael R. Herz, An Accelerating Thaw: Revisiting the Legality of Administrative Bank 
Freezes, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sept. 2012, at 40, 41–43. 
 74. Strumpf, 516 U.S. at 16. 
 75. See infra Part II (discussing one such ambiguity). 
 76. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 19–20, City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021) 
(No. 19-357), 2020 WL 583728 (discussing unsettled state of the law). 
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operate, parties who find themselves in bankruptcy court cannot know 
their rights and obligations.77 
II. CURRENT LAW AND ITS EMERGENCE 
The Supreme Court held in City of Chicago v. Fulton that 
passive retention of estate property does not violate the automatic 
stay.78 As a dichotomous question, it is important to understand the two 
approaches the Court could have taken—previously the majority and 
the minority approach. This Section first explores how circuit courts 
attempted to answer the passive retention question and then explains 
the Supreme Court’s reasoning in reaching its ultimate, yet limited, 
decision with regard to § 362(a). 
Courts were previously split on the proper interpretation of the 
automatic stay provision, which prohibits “any act to obtain possession 
of property of the estate . . . or to exercise control over property of the 
estate.”79 The most common dispute over the meaning of “any act . . . to 
exercise control” surrounded instances in which a creditor had 
repossessed a debtor’s vehicle, though the statutory language applies to 
all types of property.80 Five circuits and the Sixth Circuit Bankruptcy 
Appellate Panel held that retention of property of the estate possessed 
before the debtor filed for bankruptcy must be immediately turned over 
to the bankruptcy trustee, without first requiring a turnover motion or 
adequate protection.81 Three circuits held directly the opposite: that 
passive retention is not a creditor exercising control over property of the 
estate and therefore does not violate the automatic stay.82  
The binary nature of “yes, it violates the stay” or “no, it does not 
violate the stay” meant that the Supreme Court had to adopt either the 
 
 77. Compare In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 924 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that creditors must 
turnover all property upon the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy), with In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 
115, 128 (3rd Cir. 2019) (holding that creditors are not required to turnover property immediately). 
 78. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 587 (2021). 
 79. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
 80. See, e.g., Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(emphasis omitted) (debtor defaulted on car payments and the creditor seized the car pre-petition); 
WD Equip., LLC v. Cowen (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943 (10th Cir. 2017) (lien placed on truck pre-
petition and the creditor seized the car). 
 81. See In re Fulton, 926 F.3d at 920 (holding that creditors must turnover all property upon 
the debtor’s filing for bankruptcy); Weber v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2013) 
(same); Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier (In re Rozier), 376 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2004) (per 
curiam) (same); Cal. Emp. Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(same); Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773 (8th Cir. 1989) (same). 
 82. See In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 119 (holding that creditors are not required to 
turnover property immediately); In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949–51(same); United States v. Inslaw, 
Inc., 932 F.2d. 1467 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (same). 
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majority’s or the minority’s approach.83 Because the Supreme Court 
cannot change the statute, it must continue to deal with the text as is. 
While the majority approach effectuated more accurate policy goals, its 
analysis of the statutory text was flawed.84 The minority approach, 
while more faithful to the text of the Bankruptcy Code, disadvantages 
debtors in a way that seems incongruous with the spirit of the Code.85 
Because neither approach fully addresses both the text of the 
Bankruptcy Code and the policy concerns behind it, the Supreme Court 
ruling on this issue remains inadequate. The Fulton case resulted in 
the Court adopting much of the minority approach, although its 
reasoning was based mostly on a natural reading of the text and 
potential problems with the turnover provision if § 363(a) were to be 
interpreted differently.86 
A. Majority Approach: Policy and Practical Considerations  
with No Roots in the Text 
The circuits previously following the majority approach adopted 
a debtor-friendly approach, holding that creditors are obligated to 
immediately turn over any property seized prior to the bankruptcy 
filing.87 Under this approach, Chicago, located in the Seventh Circuit, 
would have to return any of the vehicles seized for unpaid parking 
tickets as soon as it had knowledge that the debtor had filed for 
bankruptcy.88 The majority approach purported that it faithfully 
interpreted the text, although it did so by ignoring certain language in 
the automatic stay provision.89 This approach, however, would have 
broadened the automatic stay, which is more in line with the policy 
considerations of giving the debtor a breathing spell and protecting 
assets from audacious creditors.90 Ultimately, this approach succeeded 
 
 83. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct 680 (2019). 
 84. See infra Section II.A. 
 85. See infra Section II.B.  
 86. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 590–92 (2021). 
 87. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d at 924; Weber v. SEFCU (In re Weber), 719 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 
2013); Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Rozier (In re Rozier), 376 F.3d 1323, 1324 (11th Cir. 2004) (per 
curiam); Cal. Emp. Dev. Dep’t v. Taxel (In re Del Mission Ltd.), 98 F.3d 1147, 1152 (9th Cir. 1996); 
Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 773, 775 (8th Cir. 1989). 
 88. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d at 924. 
 89. See, e.g., id. at 923 (with the subheading “exercise control”). 
 90. See United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203–05 (1983) (“Congress intended 
a broad range of property to be included in the estate.”); In re Sharon, 234 B.R. 676, 685 (B.A.P. 
6th Cir. 1999) (holding that the onus is on creditors to return improperly seized assets and not on 
the debtor to go and get them). 
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in its policy considerations, but failed in its textual analysis, leading the 
Supreme Court to reject it.91  
1. Textual Analysis: The Majority’s Focus on “Exercise Control” 
The majority approach elevated policy and practical 
considerations in its interpretation of the automatic stay and turnover 
provisions. This approach required creditors to return to the debtor 
property that had been seized pre-petition.92 By reading § 362(a)(3) 
more liberally, this approach effectuates increased debtor protection 
and gives a bankruptcy petition more power. It does so by focusing on 
the “exercise control” language of § 362(a)(3) rather than the more 
complete phrase “any act . . . to exercise control.”93 “Exercising control” 
alone does not require an “act,” whereas “any act . . . to exercise control” 
does require some affirmative activity.94 This focus made it easier for 
the courts to conclude that “holding onto an asset, refusing to return it, 
and otherwise prohibiting a debtor’s beneficial use of an asset all fit 
within th[e] definition, as well as the commonsense meaning of the 
word[s ‘exercise control’].”95 Because of this broader interpretation, 
courts could easily determine that there is no difference between 
property a creditor seized before the debtor filed for bankruptcy and 
passively retains and property a creditor seizes in the middle of a 
bankruptcy case. If courts equate maintaining possession with 
exercising control, then failure to return the property, “regardless of 
whether the original seizure was lawful, constitutes a prohibited 
attempt to ‘exercise control over the property of the estate’ in violation 
of the automatic stay.”96 Therefore, for example, even if the City of 
Chicago legally impounded a debtor’s vehicle for failure to pay parking 
or traffic violations, it would have to immediately return the car when 
the debtors file for bankruptcy.97 The majority courts treated the pre-
petition seizure just as if the city had seized the car one year into the 
bankruptcy proceeding, which is clearly forbidden.  
The majority courts also cited legislative history to support their 
reading of the text, though their analysis was often fleeting and 
 
    91 City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585 (2021).  
 92. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d at 921; In re Weber, 719 F.3d at 79; In re Rozier, 376 F.3d at 1324; 
In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 F.3d at 1151; In re Knaus, 889 F.2d. at 775. 
 93. See, e.g., In re Fulton, 926 F.3d at 923 (with the subheading “exercise control”). 
 94. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3). 
 95. Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 96. In re Knaus, 889 F.2d at 775. 
 97. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 9-100-120 (making it legal to impound a debtor’s vehicle); In 
re Fulton, 926 F.3d at 923 (requiring the creditor to return the seized asset once the debtor  
declares bankruptcy). 
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conclusory. These courts argued that because the language of the Code 
was amended from “to obtain possession” to “to obtain possession 
or . . . to exercise control,” Congress intended to broaden the scope of 
§ 362(a)(3).98 According to this reasoning, the change from prohibiting 
mere possession indicated that Congress meant to encompass 
something more.99 Bankruptcy courts following the majority approach 
often spoke of the legislative history in either veiled or clearly offered 
assumptions. One court phrased its legislative history analysis in these 
terms: the congressional amendment “hints [ ] that this kind of ‘control’ 
might be a broadening of the concept of possession . . . .”100 Another 
court stated what Congress’s intent was without explanation: the 
language “was added by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal 
Judgeship Act of 1984 to clarify that the automatic stay extends to any 
exercise of control over property of the estate . . . .”101  
The legislative history, however, contains no explanation or 
commentary as to why Congress made this change.102 While Congress 
clearly intended to expand the automatic stay by enacting changes to 
the code in 1984, the majority approach’s conclusion that it must extend 
to all exercises of control over estate property is not definitive. Thus, 
while the majority approach’s textual analysis was suspicious,  
its interpretation of § 362(a)(3) had a stronger foundation on  
other grounds. 
2. Policy Concerns: A True Breath of Fresh Air 
Policy and practical considerations mainly drove the majority’s 
textual analysis, and this becomes clear when one considers the 
ramifications of any alternative interpretation. These courts sought to 
benefit the debtor by returning their property, which would in turn put 
creditors on a more even playing field. Relying on Whiting Pools, the 
Seventh Circuit in In re Fulton stated that the “primary goal” of 
reorganization bankruptcy is to “group all of the debtor’s property 
together in his estate . . . this necessarily extends to all property, even 
property lawfully seized pre-petition.”103  
 
 98. In re Del Mission Ltd., 98 F.3d at 1151. 
 99. Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702; In re Young 193 B.R. 620, 623 (Bankr. D.C. 1996). 
 100. Javens v. City of Hazel Park (In re Javens), 107 F.3d 359, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)  
(emphasis added). 
 101. Abrams v. Sw. Leasing and Rental Inc. (In re Abrams), 127 B.R. 239, 241 (9th Cir.  
B.A.P. 1991). 
 102. In re Young, 193 B.R. at 624 (citation omitted). 
 103. In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, 
Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203–04 (1983)).  
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Likewise, the court in Thompson v. General Motors also outlined 
major policy concerns shared by many circuit courts in the majority 
approach that favored placing the burden on the creditor to seek judicial 
relief.104 First, the purpose of bankruptcy is to allow the debtor to 
“regain his financial foothold.”105 Therefore, while the Bankruptcy Code 
benefits both creditors and debtors, the primary goal is to aid the 
unfortunate debtor. In the case of a seized car, it greatly benefits the 
debtor to have her car returned to her. Without the car, it could be 
difficult for her to get to work, only compounding financial troubles. 
Second, adopting the alternative approach would give creditors too 
much bargaining power in that they could hold onto property until they 
subjectively felt they were adequately protected.106 For example, the 
City of Chicago could demand not only insurance but also periodic 
payments to account for depreciation of the vehicle. Third, in Whiting 
Pools, the Court made clear that such self-help is prohibited under the 
Bankruptcy Code.107 Creditors may not pursue collection efforts outside 
of the bankruptcy case.108 Lastly, requiring a creditor to bear the costs 
of seeking relief assists not only the debtor but all of the creditors.109 
Having all creditors file one motion in court is far less demanding than 
having the debtor file “a myriad of motions” to recover his assets.110 
Filing turnover motions and enduring adequate protection proceedings 
often involves an attorney, whose fees come out of the “pot” of the 
debtor’s assets. If the “pot” is needlessly depleted, all creditors end up 
with less than they would have had otherwise.  
The majority courts adopted a broad reading of “exercise control” 
because it best enables a debtor to use her own property, which is vitally 
important for the completion of some bankruptcy cases. For example, 
perhaps only with the return of her car can a debtor get to work, which 
 
 104. Thompson, 566 F.3d at 706–07. 
 105. Id. at 706. 
 106. Id. at 707; see also TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Sharon (In re Sharon), 234 B.R. 676, 685 
(B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999) (“A Chapter 13 debtor’s right to possession and use of her car [should] not 
[be] dependent on the subjective judgment of a creditor . . . .”). Courts also see this as better policy 
for creditors who do not withhold a turnover and would suffer the cost because the debtor would 
be less able to pay all creditors back. See Knaus v. Concordia Lumber Co. (In re Knaus), 889 F.2d 
773, 775 (8th Cir. 1989) (explaining that if creditors could maintain possession until they felt 
protected, “the powers of a bankruptcy court and its officers to collect the estate for the benefit of 
creditors would be vastly reduced”). 
 107. Whiting Pools, 462 U.S. at 203–04. 
 108. See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 702 (holding that passively continuing to possess property is 
an exercise of control by creditors). 
 109. See id. at 707 (reasoning that allowing free use of assets by the debtor is better for both 
the debtor and creditors). 
 110. Id. 
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benefits not only herself but also her creditors who expect to be repaid 
through a successful plan.111  
B. Minority Approach: Faithful Adherence to the  
Text with Harsh Consequences 
The three circuits in the minority approach—which the Supreme 
Court adopted—held that creditors do not have an affirmative 
obligation to immediately return property seized legally pre-petition.112 
This approach interprets the text of the automatic stay provision more 
completely, reading the entire phrase of the statute rather than 
focusing on certain words in isolation (“any act . . . to exercise control” 
rather than “ . . . exercise control” alone).113 Because this approach is 
now law, all debtors are subject to potential collection efforts by 
creditors who can enforce their debts outside of the bankruptcy process 
by maintaining possession.114  
1. Textual Analysis: The Minority’s Focus On “Act” 
In 1991, the D.C. Circuit became the first circuit court to adopt 
the minority approach that passive retention of estate property does not 
violate § 362(a)(3).115 In United States v. Inslaw, Inc., the debtor was a 
corporation that created a case-tracking software under contract for the 
Department of Justice.116 Even after the corporation filed for chapter 11 
bankruptcy, the Department of Justice continued to use the software 
and introduced it into other U.S. Attorney offices.117 The court held that 
since the debtor did not have a possessory interest in the tapes 
containing the software, the Department of Justice did not violate the 
automatic stay by maintaining possession.118 The D.C. Circuit Court 
emphasized the “act” language of § 362(a)(3) in its textual analysis and 
claimed to be more accurately interpreting the statute when it stated 
that “[n]owhere in [§ 362(a)]’s language is there a hint that it creates 
 
 111. In re Sharon, 234 B.R. at 682. 
 112. See In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 132 (3d Cir. 2019) (adopting the minority 
approach); Cowen v. WD Equip., LLC (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943, 950 (10th Cir. 2017) (adopting 
the minority approach); United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d. 1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1991) 
(adopting the minority approach). 
 113. See, e.g., Inslaw, 932 F.2d at 1474. 
 114. See Thompson, 566 F.3d at 706 (reasoning that the minority approach allows for creditors 
in possession to exercise more power). 
 115. Inslaw, 932 F.2d. at 1474. 
 116. Id. at 1468.  
 117. Id. at 1468–69. 
 118. Id. at 1472. 
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an affirmative duty to remedy past acts of . . . harassment as soon as a 
debtor files a bankruptcy petition.”119  
The other circuits that joined the minority approach better 
elaborated why the focus is on the “any act” language—perhaps because 
they had more to prove as the majority approach grew stronger.120 
Instead of focusing on “exercise control,” as did the majority, the 
minority approach turned first to the beginning of the provision and 
asked if “any act” had occurred.121 Breaking the grammar down even 
more finely, one judge wrote that “ ‘any act’ is the prepositive modifier 
of [the] infinitive phras[e].”122 Because holding onto something does not 
change the “status quo,” no act occurs at all.123 This means that an 
exercise of control (like maintaining possession) alone is not sufficient 
to violate the automatic stay.124 To violate the stay in these circuits, the 
creditor must have actually done something, such as seized the vehicle, 
after the bankruptcy case had begun. 
While the courts advocating for the majority approach insisted 
that the legislative history supported their interpretation, the minority 
circuits asserted that their approach held more closely to congressional 
intent. The Tenth Circuit in In re Cowen stated that “Congress does not 
‘hide elephants in mouseholes.’ . . . If Congress had meant to add an 
affirmative obligation . . . to turn over property belonging to the estate, 
it would have done so explicitly.”125  
The legislative history analysis differed slightly among courts in 
the minority.126 The D.C. Circuit in Inslaw stated that “Congress gave 
no explanation” when it added the “exercise control” language to 
§ 362(a), though it mentioned in passing that one court had traced the 
language back to the 1978 Bankruptcy Act.127 The 1978 Act Senate 
Report reveals Congress intended for the property covered by the 
automatic stay to be only “property over which the estate has control or 
 
 119. Id. at 1474. 
 120. See In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 125 (3d Cir. 2019) (interpreting “any act” to 
require an affirmative, not passive, act); Cowen v. WD Equip., LLC (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943, 
949 (10th Cir. 2017) (interpreting “any act” to require “doing something”, which does not include 
“passively holding onto an asset”). 
 121. John T. Gregg, Big Things Have Small Beginnings–Passive Retention of Property of the 
Estate Repossessed Prepetition, 28 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 220, 236–41 (2019). 
 122. In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949. 
 123. Gregg, supra note 121. 
 124. Denby-Peterson v. Nu2u Auto World, 595 B.R. 184, 190 (D.N.J. 2018). 
 125. In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949–50 (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S.  
457, 468). 
 126. See, e.g., In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 124 (3d Cir. 2019); In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 
949–50; United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1473 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1991). 
 127. Inslaw, 932 F.2d at 1473 n.3. 
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possession.”128 Therefore, property seized pre-petition, such as a car 
with overdue parking tickets, could not fall under the automatic stay 
because the debtor did not have possession of the car when the case 
began. The Tenth Circuit, on the other hand, relied solely on the 1984 
amendments to the Code.129 It held that Congress’s addition of the word 
“control” meant only to distinguish the new language from acts to obtain 
possession, which were already prohibited.130 In this way, the court 
argued, Congress meant to prohibit only other acts that exercise control, 
such as a creditor selling off estate property that was in its possession 
or taking advantage of intangible property that was not concretely in 
anyone’s possession.131 In the vehicle cases, this means the city is 
prohibited only from selling the debtors’ vehicles that it had seized prior 
to the filings.132 Lastly, the Third Circuit did not rely on the legislative 
history at all, asserting that the language “act . . . to exercise control” 
clearly indicated that maintaining possession of estate property does 
not violate the automatic stay.133 Even though the minority circuits 
could not agree why the legislative history did support (or was 
irrelevant to) their collective interpretation, the minority’s strongest 
textual arguments rested on the plain meaning of the words in the 
Code. And because the plain meaning argument itself does not require 
a consideration of legislative history, it therefore remains persuasive.134  
2. Policy Concerns: Protecting Creditors’ Rights 
While textual arguments drive the minority approach, the Third 
Circuit claimed that its approach also effectuates bankruptcy’s policy 
goals, albeit different goals from the debtor-friendly majority 
approach.135 The Third Circuit asserted “that one of the automatic 
stay’s primary purposes is ‘to maintain the status quo between the 
 
 128. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 50 (1978). 
 129. See In re Cowen, 849 F.3d at 949–50 (relying on statutory amendments to assist in 
statutory interpretation). 
 130. Id. at 949 (citing Ralph Brubaker, Turnover, Adequate Protection, and the Automatic Stay 
(Part II): Who Is “Exercising Control” Over What?, 33 BANKR. L. LETTER, Sept. 2013, Westlaw 33 
No. 9 BLL-NL 1). 
 131. Id. at 950. 
 132. The City of Chicago did, however, improperly sell some of the seized vehicles for scrap 
metal in order to offset the ticket debts. Oral Argument at 11:21, In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916 (7th 
Cir. 2019) (No. 18-2527), http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/sound/2019/cm.18-2527.18-2527_05_14_ 
2019.mp3 [https://perma.cc/D7XX-ZK58]. 
 133. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); see In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 124–25 (3d Cir. 2019) 
(claiming that because the language is unambiguous, the court need not look to legislative history). 
 134. See generally Yates v. United States, 574 U.S. 528, 537–39 (2015) (discussing at depth 
the plain-meaning rule of statutory interpretation).  
 135. In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d at 126. 
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debtor and [his] creditors, thereby affording the parties and the 
[Bankruptcy] Court an opportunity to appropriately resolve competing 
economic interests in an orderly and effective way.’ ”136 Many cases 
repeated this “status quo” language as a maxim.137 In Chicago, the city 
argued that the status quo would allow the city to continue keeping the 
cars in impound lots, exactly where they were before the debtor filed 
her bankruptcy petition.138 This seems to further a policy of not giving 
debtors a possessory interest that they did not have at the beginning  
of the case, but this argument is nowhere explicitly stated in the  
circuit cases.  
C. Strengths and Weaknesses of Each Approach 
Because policy concerns drove the majority’s textual 
interpretation, critics of the approach found fault with the choice to 
analyze only the “exercise control” language of the statute and not the 
more complete phrase, “any act . . . to exercise control . . . .”139 If a court 
adopts the language’s plain meaning, the inclusion of the word “act” 
prohibits affirmative actions taken only after the debtor files for 
bankruptcy. If a creditor seized the property pre-petition, it is not 
“acting” at all because it is not changing its position.140 The City of 
Chicago even argued that if “any act . . . to exercise control” includes 
every possible exercise of control over property of the estate, then the 
words “any act” become surplusage.141 In the city’s mind, “any act” is 
 
 136. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Taylor v. Slick, 178 F.3d 698, 702 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 137. See, e.g., In re Winters, 604 B.R. 54, 59 (Bankr. D. Utah 2019) (quoting First Nat’l Bank 
v. Roach (In re Roach), 660 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1981)) (“[The creditor] merely maintained the 
status quo . . . . This is consistent with the purpose of the automatic stay provision.”); In re New 
Am. Food Concepts, Inc., 70 B.R. 254, 257–58 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987) (“In litigation concerning 
the automatic stay, the Code generally seeks to leave matters in a status quo posture, . . . to 
provide a reasonable opportunity for a financially distressed debtor, its creditors, and the Court to 
determine whether there are reasonable prospects for the debtor’s survival.”). 
 138. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 49, at 19. 
 139. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3); see Brubaker, supra note 130 (“The majority position is highly 
dubious . . . driven more by certain ‘practical considerations’ . . . than a sound, principled 
interpretation of the meaning of the relevant Code provisions.” (footnote omitted)); see also Anne 
Zoltani & Janice Miller Karlin, Examining § 362(a)(3): When “Stay” Means Stay, 36 AM. BANKR. 
INST. J., May 2017, at 20 (discussing the difference between a focus on “exercise control” and “any 
act to exercise control”). 
 140. See United States v. Inslaw, Inc., 932 F.2d 1467, 1474 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (making it clear 
that the act to exercise control over estate property must occur post-petition); John C. Chobot, 
Some Bankruptcy Stay Metes and Bounds, 99 COM. L.J. 301, 307–08 (1994) (discussing how an 
affirmative act is required to violate the stay).  
 141. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 49, at 19–20 (citing Babbitt v. Sweet Home 
Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995)). 
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obviously included in any “exercise of control.”142 Therefore, the more 
specific word must be controlling.143  
Additionally, requiring an affirmative action by the creditor 
makes clear why Congress included the turnover provision in a 
completely different section of the Code.144 If the turnover power was a 
supplemental explanation of what creditors must do under the 
automatic stay, it would not be free standing with no mention of its 
connection to the automatic stay.145 The minority’s analysis of the 
legislative history was more measured and did not assume that 
Congress intended to broaden the stay as widely as the majority 
claimed.146 After all, Congress does not hide elephants in mouseholes.147  
The majority’s approach, however, would have better enabled a 
debtor to actually complete her plan. Without the necessary 
transportation to go to work, a chapter 13 debtor will default, risking 
dismissal of her case.148 A debtor’s life will not be the fresh start 
envisioned by the Bankruptcy Code.149 Instead, following dismissal, she 
will be in an even worse position—having spent time and money on the 
case without receiving the discharge of debt. The majority’s 
interpretation would benefit not only debtors, then, but also creditors, 
who, upon dismissal, lose their collective action benefits and return to 
individualized efforts.150  
Even if a case is not dismissed, creditors are better off if a debtor 
can access her vehicle. Because a debtor’s payment plan uses the last 
six months of income to determine the debtor’s ability to pay creditors 
in chapter 12 and 13 cases, creditors also benefit if the debtor’s income 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. See, e.g., Nitro-Lift Techs., L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. 17, 21 (2012) (discussing the 
“ancient interpretive principle that the specific governs the general (generalia specialibus  
non derogant)”). 
 144. Brubaker supra note 39, at 4. 
 145. Id. at 6, 7. 
 146. See WD Equip., LLC v. Cowen (In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943, 949–50 (10th Cir. 2017) (citing 
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)) (“If Congress had meant to add an 
affirmative obligation—to the automatic stay provision no less, as opposed to the turnover 
provision—to turn over property belonging to the estate, it would have done so explicitly.”). 
 147. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 468. 
 148. 11 U.S.C. § 1307(c). 
 149. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918). 
 150. See 11 U.S.C. § 1307 (regarding potential dismissal); TranSouth Fin. Corp. v. Sharon (In 
re Sharon), 234 B.R. 676, 682 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 1999) (illustrating the majority approach); Melissa 
Sanchez & Sandhya Kambhampati, How Chicago Ticket Debt Sends Black Motorists into 
Bankruptcy, PROPUBLICA (Feb. 27, 2018), https://features.propublica.org/driven-into-debt/chicago-
ticket-debt-bankruptcy/ [https://perma.cc/C9H2-HCM2] (illustrating the cycle of Chapter 13 
bankruptcy filings by car owners with unpaid tickets, dismissals, and efforts to collect by Chicago). 
The collective action benefits of bankruptcy are widely known. See, e.g., MARGARET HOWARD & 
LOIS R. LUPICA, BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 13 (6th ed. 2015) (explaining how bankruptcy 
law is in part “a device for the resolution of the collective interests of creditors”). 
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was larger.151 While purporting to protect creditors’ rights, the minority 
approach ultimately disadvantages them because there is a decreased 
chance of a successful plan completion and lower plan payments from 
the beginning.152 
Therefore, one can view a choice between the majority and 
minority approaches as a choice between the lesser of two evils. Either 
the policy goals are met or the text of the statute is adhered to, but one 
cannot achieve both. 
D. The Ultimate Decision 
The Supreme Court in City of Chicago v. Fulton acknowledged 
the policy concerns at issue but chose to ground its holding in the 
statute’s text and legislative history.153 By parsing the key words “stay,” 
“act,” and “exercise control,” the Court determined that the “status quo” 
interpretation adopted by the minority approach was “the most natural 
reading.”154 In short, the Court’s choice not to separate the verb “act” 
from “exercise control” proved fatal to the majority approach because 
“saying that a person engages in an act to exercise his or her power over 
a thing communicates more than merely having that power.”155 
The Court also focused on the potential “serious problems” with 
the turnover provision if § 362(a)(3) were to forbid passive retention.156 
Although not a major worry for the lower courts, the Supreme Court 
was concerned with the superfluity of a turnover provision if the 
automatic stay were to cover passive retention.157 Additionally, because 
the turnover provision does not require the return of property of 
“inconsequential value,” any other reading of § 362(a)(3) would 
contradict § 542.  
The Court also addressed the legislative history of the Code, 
adopting the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of the 1984 amendments. 
The Court argued that reading the automatic stay as imposing a 
turnover obligation would be too large of a change for Congress to enact 
without at least including a cross-reference to § 542 or an explicit 
 
 151. See 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (explaining how the bankruptcy court determines a debtor’s 
disposable income to inform how her payment plan should look at confirmation of the plan). 
 152. See Bankr. Judges Div., Bankruptcy Basics, ADMIN. OFF. OF THE U.S. CTS. 22–28 (Nov. 
2011), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/bankbasics-post10172005.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
PGQ5-SQT6] (outlining the basics to bankruptcy, which it purports to be beneficial to both debtors 
and creditors). 
 153. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 592–94, (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 154. Id. at 590 (majority opinion). 
 155. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 
 156. Id. at 590–92. 
 157. Id. at 590–91. 
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statement of its new breadth.158 The Court, however, stated that it 
“need not decide how the turnover obligation [of] § 542 operates” in the 
Fulton case.159 
Notably, Justice Sotomayor emphatically voiced her concerns 
about how the Court’s decision would disproportionately affect minority 
debtors.160 She described the vicious cycle debtors are placed in when 
left without access to their cars and how the city’s passive retention 
interferes “not only with debtors’ ability to earn an income and pay their 
creditors but also with their access to childcare, groceries, medical 
appointments, and other necessities.”161 Although the Court did not 
address the turnover provision’s operation, Justice Sotomayor noted 
that turnover proceedings are “essentially full civil lawsuits” and deny 
debtors’ access to their vehicles for far too long.162 Despite the Court’s 
hands being tied, she pled for Congress to intervene.163 
III. SOLUTION: CONGRESS SHOULD FORBID “ANY EXERCISE OF 
CONTROL” OVER ESSENTIAL PROPERTY 
Any decision regarding the interpretation of the automatic stay 
provision was bound to have a profound impact on not only chapter 13 
cases but also chapters 11 and 12,164 as the automatic stay covers all 
chapters of bankruptcy.165 Debtors need access to their vehicles in order 
to get to work and make payments under their plans, or they risk 
having their cases dismissed, particularly in chapter 13 cases.166 
Chapter 11 debtors also operate as debtors in possession, meaning they 
should have access to their property as they stand in for the role of the 
trustee.167 Lastly, chapter 12 bankruptcy for family farmers and 
fisherman will be greatly affected by the decision as it also involves a 
 
 158. Id. at 591–92. 
 159. Id. at 592. 
 160. Id. at 593–94 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 161. Id. at 594. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. at 595. 
 164. See Bankr. Judges Div., supra note 152, at 22–28 (explaining bankruptcy basics). Chapter 
7 bankruptcy is liquidation bankruptcy, where a debtor’s property is liquidated save for a few 
exemptions. HOWARD & LUPICA, supra note 150, at 17. Chapter 12 is similar to chapter 13, but it 
is only for family farmers and family fisherman. Id. at 19. Chapter 11 is a reorganization 
bankruptcy and is used mainly by businesses, though it is available to individuals. Id. at 18. In 
Chapter 11, the business is allowed to maintain control of business operations. Id. 
 165. 11 U.S.C. § 103(a). 
 166. Id. § 1307. Dismissal means that a debtor cannot obtain a discharge of her debt, the main 
goal of filing for bankruptcy. 
 167. See HOWARD & LUPICA, supra note 150, at 18 (explaining chapter 11 bankruptcy). Any 
Supreme Court decision, however, would affect chapter 11 debtors unless it explicitly limits its 
interpretation of the automatic stay to chapter 12 and 13. 
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repayment plan. Debtors in chapter 12 may need trucks, equipment, 
and other property necessary to continue running their businesses in 
order to complete the plan.168 
The Supreme Court, however, had only two choices in resolving 
this issue—either possession of property of the estate seized pre-
petition violates the automatic stay, or it does not. In selecting one of 
the possible choices, the Supreme Court was forced to adopt either the 
textually dubious yet policy conscious majority approach, or the 
textually faithful yet practically problematic minority approach. 
Therefore, even though the split is now resolved, its resolution does not 
present the best solution for anyone. As it stands, the provision’s text 
does not effectuate the policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code.169 Thus, the 
Court was left with a dilemma in which it was incapable of rendering a 
satisfactory solution.  
The Court’s decision will affect hundreds of thousands of 
debtors, either positively or negatively.170 Last year alone, 774,940 
people and businesses filed for bankruptcy.171 Specifically, 283,413 of 
those people filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy.172 Because the Court 
adopted the minority approach, all property seized pre-petition will not 
be returned to any debtor until she initiates a turnover proceeding and, 
if requested by the creditor, provides some type of adequate protection 
such as proof of insurance or periodic payments for depreciation of  
her car.173  
The best solution for addressing the policy goals must be to 
correct the text, so debtors can regain their property. The corrected 
language must be tailored, however, to require creditors to return to 
debtors only the property that is possibly needed to complete the plan. 
In this way, creditors would be required to return essential items, such 
as cars, but not luxury items, such as stereos.  
 
 168. Id. at 19. 
 169. See supra Section II.A.2 (analyzing the majority approach’s emphasis of policy over  
strict textualism). 
 170. See Just the Facts: Consumer Bankruptcy Filings, 2006-2017, U.S. CTS. (Mar. 7, 2018), 
https://www.uscourts.gov/news/2018/03/07/just-facts-consumer-bankruptcy-filings-2006-2017 
[https://perma.cc/U4N5-87U5] (showing hundreds of thousands of chapter 7 and 13 bankruptcy 
filings every year over the past decade). 
 171. Bankruptcy Filings Increase Slightly, U.S. CTS. (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.uscourts.gov 
/news/2020/01/28/bankruptcy-filings-increase-slightly [https://perma.cc/QN3H-DFQU]. 
 172. Id.  
 173. See supra Section II.B (discussing the implications of the minority approach). 
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A. Possibility of Congressional Intervention  
This Note proposes Congress amend the Bankruptcy Code to 
resolve the lingering concerns and effectuate the policy and practical 
goals that are at the heart of the Bankruptcy Code. The phrase “any 
act . . . to exercise control” can be made clearer by amending the 
provision to read that a stay is applicable to “any exercise of control over 
property of the estate that the debtor may require for the successful 
completion of its payment plan confirmed in a chapter 12 or 13 case.” 
This language will effectuate the pro-debtor policy by removing 
improper impediments to a successful completion of a bankruptcy plan, 
and it will resolve the textual ambiguities with which both the majority 
and minority approaches struggled.174  
The amendment would expressly affect only chapter 13 and 12 
debtors.175 Debtors would receive property necessary to the completion 
of their payment plans, most likely their vehicles, immediately upon 
filing. With the immediate return of their cars, the debtors will be able 
to travel to work, earn money, and make payments on their plan with 
less difficulty. 
Congress does not often amend the Bankruptcy Code.176 The 
Code’s last major overhaul was fifteen years ago, when Congress 
enacted the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”).177 BAPCPA altered the automatic stay in 
several ways, such as allowing continued collections of domestic support 
obligations and eliminating the stay if there are indications that the 
debtor has filed the bankruptcy petition with dishonest interests.178 
Many viewed BAPCPA as creditor friendly, as it made filing for 
bankruptcy more difficult and included harsh consequences for 
“fraudulent” debtors.179 It also required debtors to undergo credit 
counseling within 180 days before filing for bankruptcy, often 
dissuading people from filing.180  
 
 174. See supra Section II.A.2 (discussing the textual interpretation adopted by the majority 
approach); supra Section II.B.2 (discussing the textual interpretation adopted by the  
minority approach). 
 175. This Note purposefully limits the amendment to cover only these chapters. 
 176. See HOWARD & LUPICA, supra note 150, at 15. The different versions of the Bankruptcy 
Code have been enacted in 1800, 1803, 1867, 1898, 1938, 1978, 1984, and 2005. Id. at 14–15. 
 177. Id. at 15. 
 178. Stuart Larsen, Understanding the New Semi-automatic Stay, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
Mar. 2006, at 22, 22, 74–75. 
 179. Rachel Ruser, Note, Analysis of The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), 2 SPNA REV. 86, 86 (2006). 
 180. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(h) (a person may not be a debtor if they have not undergone credit 
counseling); Andrew S. Erickson, Pre-Petition Credit Counseling, 39 AM. BANKR. INST. J., Jan. 
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Recently, however, Congress has shown interest in amending 
the Code.181 In 2019, Congress enacted the Small Business 
Reorganization Act.182 These amendments to the Bankruptcy Code 
created special provisions related to small business debtors in chapter 
11 and addressed certain issues with preferential transfers.183 Congress 
expects the new Act to greatly aid small business debtors in 
reorganization efforts, proof that perhaps Congress realized BAPCPA 
was overly harsh on debtors.184 The SBRA reduces the costs of filing a 
chapter 11 petition and automatically assigns a trustee to the case.185 
As a result, a debtor will be less likely to make the mistakes that are 
grounds for dismissal under BAPCPA.186 These recent Congressional 
actions suggest hope that future amendments are possible and would 
be beneficial to debtors. 
B. Amending the Text to Effectuate Underlying Policy 
1. The Automatic Stay Provision 
Congress should amend § 362(a)(3) to read “any exercise of 
control over property of the estate that the debtor may require for the 
successful completion of its payment plan confirmed in a chapter 12 or 
13 case.” As the Court’s decision in Fulton made clear, there is at 
present no way to follow the policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code and 
still remain faithful to the text.187 Congress must speak directly to  
the issue.  
 
2020, at 42, 42 (“[T]he taking of the credit-counseling course requirement pre-petition . . . became 
an obstacle for individuals to overcome.”).  
 181. James B. Bailey & Andrew J. Shaver, What New Bankruptcy Law Means for Small 
Businesses, BIRMINGHAM BUS. J., https://www.bizjournals.com/birmingham/news/2019/11/25/what 
-new-bankruptcy-law-means-for-small-businesses.html (last updated Dec. 2, 2019, 9:24 AM CST) 
[https://perma.cc/Y6NZ-2M8X]. 
 182. Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-54, 133 Stat. 1079. This act 
amends the Bankruptcy Code. 
 183. House and Senate Pass Small Business Reorganization Act of 2019, 38 AM. BANKR. INST. 
J., Sept. 2019, at 8, 8. 
 184. See id. (noting the Act was a bipartisan measure that would “streamline the bankruptcy 
process by which small business debtors reorganize and rehabilitate their financial affairs”). 
 185. Lei Lei Wang Ekvall & Timothy Evanston, The Small Business Reorganization Act: Big 
Changes for Small Businesses, BUS. L. TODAY (Feb. 14, 2020). https://www.americanbar.org/groups 
/business_law/publications/blt/2020/02/small-business-reorg/ [https://perma.cc/G546-AENT]. 
 186. Amy E. Vulpio, New Subchapter V May Be the Bankruptcy Lifeline Small Businesses Need 
to Survive COVID-19, WHITE & WILLIAMS LLP, https://www.whiteandwilliams.com/resources-
alerts-New-Subchapter-V-May-be-the-Bankruptcy-Lifeline-Small-Businesses-Need-to-Survive-
COVID-19.html (last updated Apr. 15, 2020) [https://perma.cc/TWC3-W4QU]. 
 187. See supra Section II.A (explaining the majority approach’s interpretation of Section 362 
and its shortcomings). 
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The new language proposed by this Note reconciles the 
contradictory approaches to the automatic stay. As both claimed to 
interpret the Code’s plain meaning, Congress should make the relevant 
provisions even clearer.188 The new language of the statute should 
amend the automatic stay provision to prohibit “any exercise of control 
over property of the estate that the debtor may require for the 
successful completion of its payment plan confirmed in a chapter 12 or 
13 case.” Congress will also have to make slight changes to the  
turnover provision and indicate that it overrides the adequate 
protection provision.189  
Congress should altogether eliminate the word “act” from the 
automatic stay, which currently reads “any act to obtain possession of 
property of the estate . . . or to exercise control over property of the 
estate.”190 The courts that took the majority approach ignored the words 
“any act,” interpreting only “exercise control” in their plain meaning 
analysis.191 Conversely, in their approach, the minority and Supreme 
Court interpreted “any act” to mean that only an affirmative action by 
a creditor violates the automatic stay,192 significantly narrowing the 
breadth of the automatic stay. By eliminating the “act” language, any 
textual arguments regarding “act” become moot, allowing the text to 
match the policy considerations.193 “Any exercise of control” includes 
maintaining possession as well as all other methods of control, not only 
affirmative acts.194 In this way, Congress can allow bankruptcy courts 
to adopt a more equitable approach without stretching the language of 
the Code.  
Further, amending the text would address lingering policy 
concerns. The automatic stay is intended to aid in the collective action 
of bankruptcy. Without grouping together the debtor’s property in the 
estate, individual creditors can impermissibly pressure the debtor into 
paying them back first, without regard for other creditors who may have 
 
 188. See Zoltani & Karlin, supra note 139, at 20–21 (analyzing the textual arguments of the 
majority approach and the Tenth Circuit, which at the time of their article was the only court not 
following the majority).  
 189. See 11 U.S.C. § 542 (the turnover provision); id. § 361 (the adequate protection provision).  
 190. Id. § 362(a)(3).  
 191. For example, see In re Fulton, 926 F.3d 916, 923 (7th Cir. 2019) (with the subheading 
“Exercise Control”). 
 192. See Zoltani & Karlin, supra note 139, at 61 (noting the Tenth Circuit’s determination that 
“some action is required to violate the automatic stay”). 
 193. See supra Section II.B.2. While the minority approach does give some attention to the 
exercise control language, it does so considering only what types of acts are prohibited. Ralph 
Brubaker, supra note 130. 
 194. In fact, this is already how the majority has been interpreting the automatic stay. See 
supra Section II.A. 
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priority by law.195 Prior to the ruling in In re Fulton, the City of Chicago 
was pressuring debtors in exactly this way when it seized vehicles 
before a person filed for chapter 13 bankruptcy and then refused to 
return them.196 Before the city would release a car, it required a 
motorist to “agre[e] to prioritize paying off ticket debt in their 
bankruptcy payment plan . . . . This assured the city it would get paid 
back more of what it was owed . . . .”197 By removing this tactic, 
Congress can effectuate the “equality of distribution between similarly 
-situated creditors,” a key goal in bankruptcy.198 While current numbers 
have not been released, it would appear that the application of the 
automatic stay to pre-petition property could affect 3,800 debtors in 
Chicago alone.199 With the amendments this Note proposes, all debtors 
would be positively impacted and able to retrieve their property without 
the lengthy turnover proceedings currently required.  
The addition of the words “property of the estate that the debtor 
may require for the successful completion of its payment plan” would 
require creditors to take affirmative action in regard only to property 
that is essential for a debtor’s success in bankruptcy. For example, a 
creditor would not have to return an expensive stereo system a debtor 
offered as collateral, but it would have to return a tractor seized from a 
family farmer debtor. The suggested new language would alleviate 
some of the burdens on creditors, requiring that they return  
only property that is obviously necessary to a successful completion of 
the plan.  
Further, the proposed language would not overly broaden the 
automatic stay. There are two limitations to the language that make 
the amendment less dramatic. First, by specifying that the property 
must be arguably necessary for the completion of a payment plan 
confirmed in a chapter 12 or 13 case, this provision would affect only 
debtors who have filed in those chapters. Payment plans do not exist in 
cases filed under chapter 7,200 and most businesses file under chapter 
 
 195. Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699, 702 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 
United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203–04 (1983)). 
 196. See 926 F.3d 916, 930–31 (7th Cir. 2019) (holding that vehicles seized pre-petition must 
be returned to the debtor upon filing for bankruptcy); Sanchez, supra note 9. 
 197. Sanchez, supra note 9. 
 198. HOWARD & LUPICA, supra note 150, at 15. 
 199. See Sanchez, supra note 9. The officials have not stated since In re Fulton how many cars 
they had been incorrectly holding, but prior to the initiation of the now-prohibited policy, they 
released 3,800 vehicles to debtors once the debtors filed for bankruptcy in 2016. Id. 
 200. HOWARD & LUPICA, supra note 150, at 17–19. Because chapter 12 applies only to family 
farmers and fisherman, I will not be discussing the implications of the language on chapter  
12 extensively. 
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11.201 The new language would affect a little over one third of all 
bankruptcies filed.202 Second, by requiring that the property be 
important to the completion of a plan, the provision would not apply in 
all chapter 12 or 13 cases. If a creditor has possession of property of the 
estate, the creditor would be required to return the property only if the 
debtor would require it in order to earn money to pay off the plan.  
One criticism of this amendment is that it simply adds more text 
for courts to interpret. But because many of the previous circuit court 
decisions regarding the interpretation of the text centered around a 
concern for the return of the debtor’s vehicle, the application would be 
workable.203 Once Congress amends the language of § 362(a)(3), the 
clearest application of the provision will be to require returning 
property that can be promptly assessed as critical for the debtor’s 
successful competition of a payment plan.204 Even in chapter 12 cases, 
the application of the new language should not be difficult. Examples of 
“property of the estate that the debtor may require for the successful 
completion of a payment plan” should appear readily—for example, 
farm equipment, fishing nets or boats, and delivery trucks easily fall 
within the new language proposed by this Note.  
2. Amending Other Provisions 
Congress should also resolve some of the confusion surrounding 
the turnover provision of the Bankruptcy Code.205 This could include a 
cross-reference between the automatic stay provision and the turnover 
provision to address the Court’s concerns about superfluity 
contradiction and about making large changes explicit.206 Due to the 
hedged requirement regarding property required for successful 
completion of a payment plan, not all property, the language would no 
longer be superfluous.207 It would no longer be contradictory because of 
 
 201. Chapter 11 – Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/ 
bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics (last visited Jan. 31, 2021) 
[https://perma.cc/6Y56-MBVV]. 
 202. See Bankruptcy Filings Increase Slightly, supra note 171. 774,940 total bankruptcies 
were filed in 2019, and only 284,008 were chapter 12 or 13. 
 203. See, e.g, Thompson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 566 F.3d 699 (7th Cir. 2009) (debtor 
defaulted on car payments and the creditor seized the car pre-petition); WD Equip., LLC v. Cowen 
(In re Cowen), 849 F.3d 943 (10th Cir. 2017) (lien placed on truck pre-petition and the creditor 
seized the car). 
 204. See Sanchez, supra note 9 (explaining the difficulties chapter 13 debtors face in making 
plan payments when they do not have access to their vehicle that they drive to work).  
 205. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (the adequate protection provision); Id. § 542 (the turnover provision); 
Brubaker, supra note 130. 
 206. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 591–92 (2021). 
 207. Id. at 591. 
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the same limiting language in the amended § 362.208 Finally, it would 
bring to light the interaction between the sections and acknowledge 
that this is a major change in statutory turnover requirements.209 
 Congress should also make clear that the turnover provision 
controls over the adequate protection provision, which it could do with 
a minor reference between the provisions. One reason many creditors 
maintain possession of property of the estate is because they do not see 
the turnover provision as mandatory until adequate protection over 
their security interest has been provided by the court.210 Without 
requiring turnover to happen first, however, the proposed automatic 
stay amendments will not be as effective. If a creditor may hold onto 
vehicles until they receive court-ordered adequate protection, the policy 
arguments that support the idea that maintaining possession of 
property of the estate violates the automatic stay are reduced. The 
debtor will still have to undergo court proceedings in order to regain 
possession of her property.211 Therefore, by clarifying that the turnover 
provision has priority over the adequate protection provision, many of 
the policy goals would be embedded into the statute.  
Adequate protection is a valid concern of creditors, as returning 
a vehicle without insurance could cause serious problems if the debtor 
gets in a car accident or otherwise destroys the car.212 But creditors 
have ample protection to avoid such a concern.213 In the automatic stay 
provision itself, the Code requires a court to “grant relief from the 
stay . . . for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an 
interest in property of such party in interest.”214 The creditor may seek 
stay relief without notifying the debtor.215 Courts will not potentially 
nullify liens by returning uninsured vehicles to debtors. As one court 
noted, courts “take[ ] the lack of insurance seriously and will not permit 






 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 592. 
 210. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 76 at 9. 
 211. In re Denby-Peterson, 941 F.3d 115, 128 (3d Cir. 2019). 
 212. Hon. Eugene R. Wedoff, Return of Vehicles Seized Before a Chapter 13 Filing; Does the 
Debtor Have to File a Turnover Motion?, 38 AM. BANKR. INST. J., APR. 2019, at 14, 14.  
 213. Id. 
 214. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). 
 215. Wedoff, supra note 212, at 14. 
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insured.”216 Additionally, creditors may, from the beginning of the case, 
refuse to return an uninsured vehicle.217 Courts can “retroactively 
validate” a vehicle’s retention by granting a relief from the stay, 
preventing any sanctions against the creditor for not returning the 
vehicle.218 These alternative measures give reassurance to creditors 
with legitimate concerns regarding adequate protection while requiring 
creditors who seek only to enforce their own repayment to return an 
insured vehicle immediately upon a debtor’s filing for chapter 13.219  
CONCLUSION 
In chapter 13 cases, a debtor often requires her vehicle to earn 
money to make her plan payments. As the law currently stands, 
however, creditors such as the City of Chicago are able to take these 
vehicles and not return them to the debtor, even after she files for 
bankruptcy. Section 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code is supposed to offer 
debtors a chance to breathe by halting the collection efforts of all 
creditors.220 Because the Bankruptcy Code envisions collective action as 
an effective tool to fairly repay creditors, it also protects a debtor’s 
remaining assets from dissipation by aggressive creditors trying to cut 
the line.221 The automatic stay could be a mechanism to return some of 
the most essential property to a debtor, thus effectuating the purpose 
of the Bankruptcy Code. The Court, however, could not transform the 
words of the Code to fit the purpose by itself. Therefore, Congress 
should heed Justice Sotomayor’s request to reconsider the language  
in §§ 362(a) and 542 and clarify what the automatic stay requires  
of creditors.222  
This Note proposes that Congress amend § 362(a)(3) to codify 
language that would best effectuate the fundamental policy goals of the 
Bankruptcy Code. Specifically, Congress should prohibit any exercise of 






 216. Stephens v. Guaranteed Auto, Inc. (In re Stephens), 495 B.R. 608, 615 n.8 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ga. 2013).  
 217. Wedoff, supra note 212, at 14. 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id.; Sanchez, supra note 9. 
 220. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).  
 221. HOWARD & LUPICA, supra note 150, at 13. 
 222. City of Chicago v. Fulton, 141 S. Ct. 585, 595 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
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successful completion of a payment plan confirmed in a chapter 12 or 
13 case. This new language would clarify the current textual 
ambiguities in the automatic stay provision, allow debtors to regain 
possession of essential property, and maintain creditors’ current rights 
of adequate protection in a way that would benefit all parties involved 
in a chapter 12 or 13 bankruptcy case.  
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